Tehran's Strategic Defeat in Iraq
The Huffington Post, April 6, 2010
Alireza Jafarzadeh, Foreign Affairs Analyst and Iran Expert
The
March 7 parliamentary elections have heralded a new era for
Iraq, pushing aside the incumbent Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki
and officials with ties to Iran while opening way for a new
slate of politicians hoping to mend serious sectarian
divides. But, as a U.S. military official in Iraq told the
Washington Post, Maliki and his allies "have no intention of
giving up their regime," something that could threaten the
hard earned post-election gains for progress and stability
and harm US troops withdrawal timetable.
"These are people who were exiled and who've risen to power
almost overnight because we brought them back to power," the
official was quoted as saying. "Now they're going to lose
that relative lock on power through these elections," which
explains the Maliki bloc's frantic reaction to its defeat.
With the Iraqiya coalition declared as the winner of the
March 7 vote, arduous talks are now under way to form a new
government. The triumph of the cross-sectarian and
nationalist Iraqiya list, headed by former PM Ayad Allawi,
represents a major threat to the ambitious agenda of the
regime in neighboring Iran.
Mr. Allawi and his allies managed to win the most votes,
overcoming monumental political and security obstacles and
thwarting Iran's bag of dirty tricks, while displaying
surprising resilience and strength. Tehran will no doubt
heighten its already extensive interference in a bid to rob
Iraqis of their electoral choices and engineer a surrogate
government in Baghdad.
Still, regardless of which political blocks will ultimately
succeed in forming the next government, the Iranian regime
and its Iraqi allies have been dealt a strategic blow as
Iraq takes small and fragile steps toward a pluralistic
democracy. Iran's state-run media are lamenting the "lost
opportunity," launching a disinformation campaign to tarnish
the historic electoral performance of the nationalist and
non-sectarian political forces.
The defeat of the pro-Tehran Shiite groups in no way signals
rising sectarian politics and a Sunni resurgence, as some
suggest. Far from it, this was a definitive victory for
nationalism and secularism -for Shiites and Sunnis alike.
The Iraqiya block is made up of Shiites and Sunnis, and
offered an anti-sectarian platform welcomed by Iraqis of all
stripes. Sensing which way the wind was blowing, al-Maliki's
State of Law bloc tried unsuccessfully to portray itself as
a nationalist alternative, ready to change from its
sectarian, Tehran-friendly politics of the past four years.
Behind the scene, however, al-Maliki did his utmost to do
Tehran's bidding and his emissaries were constantly pacing
back and forth between the two capitals. At Tehran's
bidding, for example, he laid siege to Camp Ashraf,
residence of several thousand Iranian dissidents, members of
Iran's main opposition People's Mojahedin of Iran
(PMOI/MEK). In July this culminated in a deadly assault on
the unarmed camp, causing eleven deaths and injuring 500.
Al-Maliki's clout as incumbent prime minister also gave him
unrivaled opportunity to woo influential groups through
political and economic incentives.
In the end, however, his ties with Tehran were too extensive
to be cloaked with his newly-found ostensible affection for
a secular, nationalist agenda. He underestimated how deeply
Tehran and its surrogates, after years of bloodshed and
meddling, are loathed by Iraq's people.
The disillusionment with the dominant Shiite blocks that
effectively acted as Tehran's clients was glaring, nowhere
more than the Shiite neighborhoods. The estimated 60%
increase in Sunni voters and nearly 18% decline in overall
voter participation, denote a whopping decrease in the
Shiite turnout.
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and its
extraterritorial arm, Qods Force had marshaled all their
financial, political, and security forces to hijack the
March 7 elections. They pumped tens of millions of dollars
monthly into the country, assassinated secular Iraqis, and
used the Justice and Accountability Commission, to
disqualify hundreds of unyielding politicians from running.
The Washington Post's David Ignatius reported that according
to a de-classified intelligence document: "Iran supports de-Baathification
efforts engineered by Ahmed Chalabi for the purpose of
eliminating potential obstacles to Iranian influence.
Chalabi is also interested in Iran's assistance in securing
the office of prime minister."
In the end, Iraq's nationalism defeated Tehran's meddling.
Nevertheless, one must remain increasingly vigilant.
Although dealt a heavy blow, the ayatollahs' regime is still
not willing to lose the "Iraq opportunity." Iraqi surrogates
and friends have been invited to Tehran to coordinate plans
set in motion for the post-election phase.
A state-run news site in Iran, Khabar Online, recently
wrote: "Iran plays an important role in determining the next
prime minister of Iraq, and anyone occupying this post must
have a positive view of Tehran."
For years, Tehran has declared its intention to fill the
vacuum when US forces leave Iraq. The March 7 elections were
critical to this strategy. Building on the homegrown
foundations which pulled the rug out from under the
ayatollahs, Iraq's people must deny Iran's rulers the chance
to once again plunge Iraq into sectarian strife. The stakes
are high and America's attempts to leave Iraq in peace and
stability next year depends on it.
Alireza Jafarzadeh is the author of "The Iran Threat:
President Ahmadinejad and the Coming Nuclear Crisis"
(Palgrave MacMillan).
